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This thesis investigates some of corporate governance practices in Malaysian public 
listed companies with a particular interest in selected government linked corporation 
(GLCs), participating  under the government transformation programme (GTP). Thus, 
this study uses board characteristics, government ownership and performance as 
independent variables that affect directors’ remuneration. The board characteristics 
consists of board size, proportional of independent director, proportional independent 
director in remuneration and audit committee and CEO tenure. The control variables 
used are firm size, leverage and growth in this study. The study explains the 
relationship between director remuneration and corporate governance structures in a 
distinguished setting when the government has some influence in corporate decision 
making. There are 20 GLCs (known as G20s) selected under implementation of 
government transformation programmes starting from 2004. The study is conducted 
based on balanced data under observation for 6 years (2010-2015). However, due to 
sample selection criteria, there are only fifteen companies left for selection in this 
study. The agency theory and steward theory are used in this study to determine 
whether there is an implication in the corporate governance issues towards directors’ 
remuneration. Using  pooled OLS and Panel data regression techniques, it is found that 
board characteristics – independent directors and board meeting are negatively 
significant to the directors’ remuneration. However, the government ownership and 
performance is not significant. Thus, the steward theory is rejected due to difference 
in political and policy applied by sample companies. Moreover, firm size, growth and 
leverage show significant positively relationship to the director remuneration. Finally, 
the agency theory is more relevant in explaining the corporate governance issues to 
determined director remuneration in Malaysia. 
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Kajian ini menyiasat sebahagian amalan takbir urus korporat di Malaysia dengan 
tertumpu pada syarikat berkaitan kerajaan di bawah Program Transformasi Kerajaan. 
Justeru itu, kajian ini menggunakan ciri-ciri lembaga pengarah, pemilikan kerajaan 
dan prestasi sebagai pemboleh ubah yang mempengaruhi imbuhan pengarah. Ciri-ciri 
lembaga pengarah mengandungi saiz lembaga pengarah, nisbah pengarah bebas, 
nisbah pengarah bebas dalam jawatan kuasa imbuhan dan audit serta tempoh jawatan 
ketua eksekutif. Pemboleh ubah dikawal digunakan adalah saiz syarikat, hutang dan 
peluang pertumbuhan. Kajian ini dapat dibezakan apabila kerajaan mempunyai 
pengaruh dalam membuat keputusan. Terdapat 20 Syarikat berkaitan kerajaan 
(dikenali sebagai G20) yang telah  dipilih di bawah pelaksanaan program transformasi 
kerajaan bermula dari tahun 2004.  Kajian yang dibuat adalah  ke atas data seimbang 
di bawah pemerhatian selama 6 tahun (2010-2015). Walau bagaimanapun, 
berdasarkan kriteria pemilihan sampel, terdapat hanya lima belas syarikat sahaja yang 
tinggal untuk kajian ini. Teori agensi dan steward digunakan bagi kajian ini untuk 
menentukan sama ada terdapat kesan isu takbir urus korporat terhadap imbuhan . 
Menggunakan teknik “Pool OLS” dan “Panel data regression”, kami menjumpai 
bahawa ciri-ciri lembaga pengarah – pengarah bebas  dan kekerapan mesyuarat 
lembaga mempunyai hubungan negatif kepada imbuhan pengarah. Walau 
bagaimanapun, pemilikan kerajaan dan prestasi tidak mempunyai hubungan. Jadi teori 
steward di tolak disebabkan faktor politik dan undang-undang yang diguna pakai bagi 
sampel syarikat. Tambahan lagi, saiz firma, pertumbuhan dan hutang menunjukkan 
hubungan positif kepada imbuhan pengarah. Akhirnya, teori agensi adalah lebih 
relevan dalam menerangkan isu takbir urus korporat dalam menentukan imbuhan 
pengarah di Malaysia.  
Keywords: Imbuhan pengarah, Ciri-ciri lembaga pengarah, pemilikan kerajaan, 
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1.1 Background of Study 
Director remuneration (compensation) is the payment made for services or 
employment of directors on the board of a company or corporation. This includes their 
basic salary and others monetary or non-monetary benefits; that an executive receives 
during his or her tenure. Generally, boards of directors are categorized into two 
different categories known as executive and non-executive directors. Executive 
directors are regarded as non-independent directors since they are assigned to specific 
operating roles within the entities such as finance, administration and operation. 
Meanwhile, non-executive directors are regarded as independent directors who are not 
directly involved in operating function. Instead, they are given tasks to monitor the 
executive directors such as chairing remuneration committee, audit committee and 
nomination committee within the board’s purview (Talha, Sallehhuddin & Masuod, 
2009). 
 
This study investigates whether the remuneration of directors is determined by board 
characteristics, government ownership and firm performance of selected Government 
Link Companies (GLCs). GLCs in Malaysia is defined as companies directly 
controlled by the Malaysian Government (Putrajaya Committee on GLC High 
Performance Transformation, 2006). In GLCs, government appoints board of 
directors’ members and senior management to make major decisions regarding 
contract awards, strategy, restructuring and financing, mergers and acquisition and 
divestment for GLCs. In pursuing the objectives, Malaysian government had initiated 
The contents of 
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PUTRAJAYA COMMITTEE ON GLC HIGH PERFORMANCE 
List of GLCs within immediate scope of GLC Transformation Programme (GLCT) 
-28 February 2013 
Affin Holdings Berhad  
Axiata Group Berhad  
BIMB Holdings Berhad  
Boustead Holdings Berhad  
Chemical Company of Malaysia Berhad  
CIMB Group Berhad  
Malayan Banking Berhad  
Malaysia Airports Holdings Berhad  
Malaysian Airline System Berhad  
Malaysian Building Society Berhad  
Malaysian Resources Corporation Berhad  
Sime Darby Berhad  
Telekom Malaysia Berhad  
Tenaga Nasional Berhad  
TH Plantations Berhad  
*UEM Group Berhad 
The G20 - currently consists of only 17 GLCs following mergers, demergers, divestments 
and other corporate exercises. 
* Unlisted Companies  




  Panel regression results with GLIC range of  ownerships 
 
Variable Model a Model b Model c Model d   
     
INDP_BRD -1.337** -1.336** -1.334** -1.370** 
 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.017 
BMEET -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.066*** -0.065*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
LNTA 0.417*** 0.417*** 0.439*** 0.462*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
MTB 0.420*** 0.419*** 0.446*** 0.430*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
LEV 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.155*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
ROA 0.046** 0.047** 0.049** 0.052** 
 0.018 0.016 0.019 0.014 
GLIC_OWN 
5%-10% (omitted)                  
                   
GLIC_OWN 
10%-20%  -0.052                 
  (0.968)                 
GLIC_OWN 
20%-50%   -0.477                
   (0.111)                
GLIC_OWN 
>50%    
0.319 
(0.118) 
     
_cons 8.649 8.640 8.358 7.801 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Ri2 64.9 65.91% 65.48% 
        
65.92%       
N 90 90 90 90 
*,**,*** indicates significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
For each variable, the first row is the coefficient while the second row is 
the p-value 
